of the historical politics of pipelines in Iran since the turn of the twentieth century in order to juxtapose the variegated power struggles around seemingly similar pieces of materials transport technology.
In 1908, the first major oil field in the Middle East was discovered in the Bakhtiyari Mountains of southwest Iran by a consortium of British speculators that came to be called the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC). At the time, oil was not yet the strategic global commodity that it would become after World War I, and pipeline and refining technologies were rudimentary at best (Ferrier 1982) . The construction of a pipeline to transport crude oil from Masjed Soleyman (MS) to the newly built refinery-port terminus on the Shatt al-Arab river at the mouth of the Persian Gulf became one of the greatest technical as well as political challenges facing APOC. The MS fields and the proposed pipeline route were located on the territories of the Bakhtiyari tribes, a fractious confederation of martial, pastoral nomads who were locked both in perpetual internal rivalries and in power struggles with a central government that had been severely weakened following the Constitutional Revolution . The pipeline's proposed terminus was the river island of Abadan, populated by Arab date farmers and pastoralists under the rule of the paramount Sheikh Khaz'al.
In the eyes of APOC the entire territory, from the rugged and remote fields of MS, through the proposed pipeline route, to the river island of Abadan, was an empty wasteland granted to it by the Iranian central government in the remarkably generous 1901 oil concession. Framing the territory as "wasteland" was convenient because the concession authorized APOC to take free possession of all such land without compensation. APOC justified this claim based on the absence of permanent settlements, agricultural farms, and private property claims registered by the central government. This perception conveniently overlooked the fluid nature of property relations in migratory pastoral societies and the social and political relations that underlined them. Tribal territory and its control was the foundation of the Bakhtiyari economy and its social and political structures. Pastoralists made seasonal use of pastures, and the maintenance of their flocks relied on migratory routes that were assigned to each clan by the tribe. Although the final decisions regarding these allocations were made by the senior khans (chieftains) after annual deliberations, it was the tribal confederacy as a whole that controlled its territory, and the khans were in no position to transfer it to outsiders for their personal benefit.
APOC entered into protracted negotiations with senior Bakhtiyari khans and Sheikh Khaz'al to permanently lease territories for oilfields, pipeline routes, and the refinery site. APOC was meticulous in its approach. It carried out cadastral mapping of all its desired territories, converting variable local units into standard British units of measurement. It conducted lengthy and hard-nosed negotiations with chieftains to draw up a firm and unambiguous legal contract over land, labor, and compensations. APOC negotiators routinely labeled the khans as greedy and dishonest for demanding unjustifiable compensation for uncultivated and empty wasteland, conveniently overlooking the fact that local land use and property relations in Bakhtiyari pastoral society or in the adjoining Khuzestan Province were not similar to rural capitalist England.
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British diplomats joined APOC representatives in their negotiations with tribal leaders, ignoring the vociferous objections of the Iranian central government that the oil concession had been granted to a private company and not a foreign government. The British insisted on a contractual language that treated the leased territories as alienable private property to be permanently transferred to APOC for the duration of the concession (sixty years). Eventually, an arrangement was made between APOC and the Bakhtiyari khans to set up a shell company called Bakhtiyari Oil Company, with the senior khans as nominal shareholders who would personally benefit from 3 percent of net profits of the oil business conducted in their territory. In addition, APOC recruited local guards to protect the pipelines, and hired tribesmen as unskilled workers organized in labor gangs to work the fields, lay the ninetymile pipeline, and build access roads and pumping stations (Lockhart 1938) .
These arrangements fundamentally undermined the cohesion of Bakhtiyari social structures and ultimately led to their permanent decline. Oilfields, pipelines, access roads, and pumping stations disrupted seasonal land use and migratory routes, which were now claimed and enclosed by APOC and defended by armed guards recruited from among the Bakhtiyari themselves. Tribal chiefs had considerable power to allocate land and territory within the confederacy, but pasture was a collective property that could not be arbitrarily alienated. According to a senior clan patriarch, "from the easternmost winter region (sardsir) of the Bakhtiyari to its westernmost summer territory (garmsir) there is not a single "hand-width" (vajab) of land without its own property deed (bonchaq), and whose ownership is uncertain" (Karimi 1978: 70) .
APOC claimed it could only negotiate with the khans and that they, in turn, would be responsible for distributing the benefits of the deal to their followers. However, the contracts were drawn in such a manner that the khans benefited personally. The windfall of wealth allowed the khans to move to cities, and they became absentee landlords, forfeiting their legitimacy among their rank and file along the way. Many ordinary tribesmen rebelled against the enclosures of their pastures and migratory routes, and soon a situation developed where the hired guardsmen and laborers would themselves collude in raids and sabotage the pipelines and oil installations when they were off work or could get away with it. The problem became especially acute during World War I, when German operatives working with disgruntled tribesmen attempted to sabotage the pipelines that were supplying the crucial fuel needed to support Britain's invading army in Mesopotamia (Ehsani 2014) .
Poverty-stricken tribesmen who benefited from the supplementary income initially welcomed the creation of a labor market in the fields and along pipelines. But they had the inconvenient habit of leaving wage work to return to their flocks and fields when seasons changed. APOC stepped up its efforts to create a permanent labor force by imposing greater spatial control. It created company towns and exclusive enclaves to house and train workers and control their spatial movements and extensive family ties and criminalized alternative forms of tribal economy in the territories under its control.
Iranian nationalists and the central government became highly concerned by APOC's virtual dominion over the region and its alliance with the Bakhtiyari and Arab tribal chieftains. Pastoral tribes began to be presented in the national press and the Majlis (parliament) as a major threat to national sovereignty, and the government rejected the validity of contracts between southern tribes and APOC. Soon after the 1921 coup d'état, the newly formed national army moved aggressively to confront and subdue the tribes. With the legitimacy of their leaders compromised, the once powerful Bakhtiyari and Arab tribal confederacies no longer had the cohesion to resist these incursions (Cronin 2007) . By the mid-1920s, the central government was powerful enough to declare all tribal territories as state land. It voided all contracts drawn between APOC and local chieftains, and the new conscript army took over the security of the oil fields and pipelines from the Bakhtiyari guards. APOC ditched its local allies and made a new alliance with the central government. By the 1930s, scattered local rebellions had been crushed, most of the senior tribal leaders were neutralized or physically eliminated, and the authoritarian government of Reza Shah imposed a brutal program of forced settlement on all pastoralists that effectively eliminated the last vestiges of their remaining autonomy.
The advent of oil capitalism in Iran and the construction of the first oil pipeline in the Middle East were based on APOC's refusal to acknowledge collective property relations among pastoralists, and the insistence on contractual relations with tribal chieftains was based exclusively on Lockean notions of clearly demarcated and permanently alienable private property. Enforcing the contracts over pipeline routes led to protracted and often violent upheavals that eventually ended in dispossessing local populations and altering existing social relations and the region's geography and political economy. The politics of property around the building of the MS-Abadan pipeline was at the center of and enabled this oil encounter (Ghosh 2007: 138-51) . On the one hand,the advent of this oil capitalism "modernized" local peasants and pastoralists by integrating them into a national and global labor and consumer market. Bakhtiyari and Arab pastoralists and peasants resisted these incursions, sometimes attacking and sabotaging the pipelines and oil facilities; but they also tried to take advantage of the wage labor market in a period of great hardship caused by World War I and its aftermath. On the other hand, once the cohesion of their tribal collectives had been undermined and their leaders had lost their legitimacy by striking lucrative individual deals with APOC, they could no longer offer an effective resistance to the combined forces of APOC and the central state.
This early instance of pipeline politics during the initial phase of protocolonial oil capitalism is quite different from the power struggles over pipelines in the same region in the late twentieth century, following the Iranian Revolution. The 1979 popular uprising that overthrew the monarchy has been conventionally framed as an "Islamic" revolution. However, I have argued elsewhere (Ehsani 2009 ) that it would be more accurate to designate it as a provincial revolt of the peripheral regions against the center-of spatially marginalized rural, provincial, and urban underclass populations against an authoritarian and delegitimized political and economic elite. The 1980s was a stark decade in postrevolution Iran, marked by the destructive Iran-Iraq war and a bloody and repressive civil war waged by the new Khomeinist state against an opposition that included the Left, nationalist, ethnic autonomists, liberals, and Islamist rivals. However, that postrevolution decade also witnessed grassroots initiatives by local populations organized in committees and newly formed revolutionary organizations such as the Construction Jihad (Jahad-e Sazandegi) to build social and physical infrastructure, such as roads, schools, electricity, and water and gas pipelines that would benefit underserved and remote local communities and regions. The scale of social and geographic changes brought about by these grassroots initiatives was staggering, but their realization was predicated on massive changes in property relations. All social revolutions challenge existing property relations, but in addition to confiscating the properties of the old elites, the tumultuous decade following the Iranian Revolution also witnessed extensive confiscations of public land by migrants, war refugees, displaced farmers and pastoralists, and the urban poor. The result was a widespread privatization of the public domain by desperate, lucky, or opportunistic individuals (Ehsani 2013) . However, the combination of high populism and contentious struggles over property relations allowed a vast network of oil, gas, and drinking and irrigation water pipelines to be constructed, often with considerable local support and participation.
Thus, despite immense deprivation caused by war, the flight of capital, and social chaos, the decade following the revolution also witnessed populist redistribution that benefited wide sectors of the ordinary population that had not shared in the material advantages of the Pahlavi Monarchy's authoritarian modernization. In particular, the widespread expansion of pipelines for water (drinking and local irrigation) and gas (for residential household consumption) during this postrevolution decade were embraced locally as an inclusive attempt to integrate and develop hitherto marginalized localities and communities.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war and the period of postwar reconstruction in the 1990s was accompanied by a sharp turn away from the redistributive populism of the previous decade, toward a neoliberal structural adjustment program of rebuilding the war-shattered economy. As part of this controversial program of postrevolutionary "normalization," the state began to reinforce and protect private property rules. It steadily reduced the public sector and its support of welfare networks, and it turned to the market and commercial relations as the cornerstone of economic revival. On the one hand, an impoverished and exhausted population that had experienced a decade of war and upheaval welcomed these measures, hoping that a turn to the free market would put an end to the severe wartime austerity and curtail the intrusions of the highly ideological Islamist state in the economy and everyday life. On the other hand, the resulting rise in social inequality and rampant commercialism led to mounting resentment against the betrayal of the egalitarian aspirations of the revolution. In particular, the widespread construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, especially major dams and water transfer pipelines, became highly controversial. Many of these projects have been built in the southwest, including Khuzestan and Bakhtiyari provinces, where the first oil pipeline was built a century ago. Multipurpose dams and water transfer projects were built in the name of national development. Dams such as Gotvand, Karun 3, or Karkheh displaced large numbers of remaining pastoralists and villagers in the highlands of Bakhtiyari, Khuzestan, and Lurestan.
As part of its agricultural and regional development planning, the state began discussing major water transfer projects through pipelines, for example, from the Karun river headwaters (many in the Bakhtiyari Mountains, from dam reservoirs) to the central plateau and the fertile plains of Isfahan and even more distant provinces. In the 1990s, another highly controversial project was floated to build a pipeline from the newly built Karkheh Dam to transfer and sell drinking water to Kuwait. State claims to rivers and water as a purely economic resource and as state property to be disposed of by technocrats negates both existing local customary rights and claims to water by riverine communities, as well as ecological and environmental considerations. Increasingly vociferous public resistance to water transfer pipelines have gathered pace since the mid-1990s. Protests began turning violent as severe droughts and global warming threatened the very sustainability of agrarian and urban communities in Khuzestan, Lurestan, and Bakhtiyari provinces. Dams and proposed water transfer pipelines have become the main target of recurring public protests against what is perceived to be the enclosure of a common resource for the benefit of more affluent customers and politically influential communities elsewhere.
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The history of pipeline politics in southwest Iran has been closely tied to relations of power around contending politics of property. Looking at the social history of pipelines in southwest Iran reveals that when local communities have had a stake and a voice in the process, the laying of pipelines has proceeded with little friction, as it did after the 1979 revolution. But when pipelines are implemented by distant and unaccountable authorities such as multinational oil corporations or the central government, they are treated as instruments of dispossession and enclosures that threaten the well-being of local society, and they are resisted.
Notes

1
As Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi, William Cronon, Andro Linklater, and numerous other historians and critical social thinkers have documented, the assumption of the universality of private property and its superiority in making productive use of land and resources has been a recurring theme in contractual dealings by colonial powers with indigenous populations. 2 See, for example, the latest protest, "The Parliament Hears a Report on Clashes in Beldaji, Which Have Left 100 Wounded and 70 People Arrested" (2016).
